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INTRODUCTION CONSIDER AN (ATEMPORAL) ECONOMY with H households, N + 1 variable commodities (such as various consumer goods and labor), M fixed factors (such as land, natural resources and various types of fixed capital)
, and a government which taxes commodities and fixed factors in order to finance various government expenditures. It is well known2 that if the government can raise its required revenue by taxing the fixed factors alone, then the resulting allocation of resources is Pareto optimal-no single household's utility or real income can be increased without decreasing the utility of some other household.
Suppose we are at an initial equilibrium where government revenue is being raised by taxing the fixed factors alone. Then the resulting equilibrium can be rationalized by maximizing a certain weighted sum of utility functions subject to various feasibility constraints. Now think of the government replacing the taxes on fixed factors with distortionary commodity taxes. In Section 3, we calculate the second order directional derivative of the above weighted sum of utility functions with respect to any feasible direction of tax change, evaluated at the initial equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. Of course, the first order directional derivatives of the weighted sum of utility functions with respect to feasible directions of tax change are zero evaluated at this initial equilibrium. We obtain a measure of economic loss due to tax distortions which is virtually identical to that of Boiteux [ Debreu, and Boiteux measure of welfare loss coincide. In this section we also introduce the concepts of Debreu optimality (which is analogous to Pareto optimality) and an endowment reducing tax change (which is analogous to the concept of a strict Pareto improving tax change studied recently by Hahn [15] , Guesnerie [14] , Harris [18] , Dixit [12] , and Weymark [32, 33] ), and we prove some propositions involving these concepts. Our model of the economy is explained in the following section. It is quite similar to the Diamond-Mirrlees [7] model with three major differences: (i) we assume that there are fixed inelastically supplied primary factors of production in the economy, (ii) we use expenditure functions instead of indirect utility functions in order to describe consumer's preferences, and (iii) we use a variable profit function instead of a transformation function in order to describe technology.
THE MODEL
Our model is explained in more detail in Diewert [10] ; however, in the present paper, specific taxes replace the ad valorem taxes used in Diewert [10] . We assume that the number of finally demanded goods, intermediate goods, and types of labor is N + 1 (one of these goods will play the role of a numeraire good) and that there are an additional M fixed factors ("land" and types of "capital") in the economy.
Denote the economy's aggregate production possibilities set as Y and let v ?> OM3 denote the M dimensional vector of fixed factors which is available to the economy.
Define the variable profit function S corresponding to Y as the solution to the following profit maximization problem: is a negative semidefinite symmetric matrix which satisfies the restrictions (7). We also make the following local assumptions on the derivatives of the expenditure functions with respect to the utility levels: where v is the vector of fixed resources which appeared as an input into the aggregate production sector. We assume that the government has the power to tax commodities and fixed factors. We assume that there are no tax distortions within the production sector, but there are tax wedges between the prices producers face (p, r) and the prices consumers face ( good is being supplied by the production sector, then ti > 0 (ti < 0) implies that the ith good is being taxed (subsidized) by the government, but if the ith good is being demanded by the aggregate production sector, then ti < 0 (ti > 0) implies that the ith commodity, a type of labor service, is being taxed (subsidized) by the government. The relationship between producer and consumer prices can be summarized as: (13) q=p+t or qo po + to, q. =p. + t..
Initially, one unit of the mth fixed factor earns a reward rm ' 0, but the government taxes this reward at the rate "Tm (subsidizes if Tm < 0) so that the after tax return to households is Sm = rm -Tm.
Again we can summarize the relationship between producer and consumer prices using vector notation as: (14) s5=_r-T.
We assume that the government spends its tax revenue on purchases of goods and services (xo,x , x?) (xO, xOT) in order to produce "government services" or "public goods," which are not listed as arguments in the household utility functions or the private production functions, since we hold xo and xo constant, in order to simplify our derivations. We assume that xio _ 0 whether the ith commodity is being supplied or demanded by the aggregate private production sector for i = 0, 1 ... N, with xo > 0 for at least one index i.
We can now list the basic demand equals supply equations in our model. Household expenditure is equal to after tax income from fixed factors for each household and thus using equation ( VTF(u)> OH is the vector of first order partial derivatives of the social welfare function F evaluated at the initial equilibrium utility levels.
In general, the government will be able to choose only N + M of the 1 + N + M tax rates in an independent manner; the remaining tax rate becomes an endogenous variable (recall that we are holding real government expenditures fixed).
For the sake of definiteness, we assume that to is the endogenous tax rate and thus t. and T are the vectors of independent tax rates. Our differentiability assumptions plus the Implicit Function Theorem imply the existence of functions u(t. , T), p. (t. , T), and to(t. , T) in a neighborhood of the original equilibrium tax rates such that equations (15) It is straightforward to verify that the optimal tax perturbation (i.e., the solution to (21) and (22) On the other hand, if ,B = ON+M, then the partial derivatives of the objective function with respect to the independent tax rates t,...., tN,Tl, ..., TM are all zeroes; i.e., the first order necessary conditions for the initial set of taxes to be a optimal are satisfied.
It is possible to express these conditions for a optimality in some alternative ways which will prove to be convenient. Referring back to equation (19) , it can be seen that we have the following necessary condition for taxes to be a optimal: (23) if Now suppose that the required government revenue is being raised by taxing (and possibly subsidizing) only the fixed factors so that commodity taxes on variable goods and services are initially zero (i.e., to = 0 and t. = ON). Then by (13), qo = po; q. = p. and thus using (5), qo0o. + q.... = OT. Using this last relation, (7) and (11), it can be verified that wTB = oT+1+N+M and wTA = IT where w T[OHS q0, q T] and 1H is a vector of ones. Thus the necessary condition for the initial system of taxes to be a optimal (24) is satisfied for a-1H.
In the following section, we shall calculate the first and second order directional derivatives of the social welfare function 1Tu with respect to feasible directions of tax change, evaluated at an initial equilibrium point where the required revenue is being raised by taxing fixed factors alone.
BOITEUX'S MEASURE OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS
Suppose that the government can raise its required revenue by taxing fixed factors alone. Then as we have seen above, the necessary condition for a optimality is satisfied for a= 1H. 6 Let the initial vector of taxes on the fixed factors be denoted by T*, while the other tax rates are initially zero.
Assuming ( 6Since the government can raise its required revenue by taxing fixed factors (some fixed factors could be subsidized), the initial allocation of resources is Pareto optimal and this allocation could be generated by maximizing a weighted sum of utility functions. The fact that the vector of utility weights a turns out to be a vector of ones is a consequence of our scaling of utility assumptions (9). defined as the following functions of the scalar variable (: (25) t 8The equivalence becomes clear if we note that aqi/at = ati /a + api /a in (31). The loss measure is approximate because we are neglecting terms beyond the second order. 9However, our normalizations (9) lead to the equivalence of the two methods of measuring losses. 
Define the hth consumer's constant utility system of commodity demand functions with respect to variations in t as Xh(t)-Vqmh(uh,q(X)); i.e., uh is to be held constant as t varies. The ith component of xh (() has

THE COEFFICIENT OF RESOURCE UTILIZATION
Let u, p, to t. , and TX denote an initial equilibrium for our economy; i.e., these variables satisfy equations (15) utility levels (i.e., let ui, p i', t t', ' and u, i'o, to, t', '.'   each satisfy (15)-(18) ), then the Hicksian measures of loss for the two equilibria will not generally be equal. Debreu's measure of loss does not suffer from this defect.
It should also be noted that Debreu's measure of loss can be regarded as a variant of a loss measure due to Allais [1, 2]: in fact if there is only a single 11Debreu employs a primal formulation rather than our dual formulation (which utilizes the expenditure functions mh and the variable profit function 7T), but more importantly, Debreu does not require the restrictions (39); instead he assumes that the government can control the distribution of income directly. We assume that each consumer's endowment of fixed factors vh is deflated by p.
'2Debreu [4, p. 285] notes that his measure of loss actually covers losses due to: (i) underemployment of physical resources, (ii) inefficiency in production, and (iii) imperfection of economic organization. Since we use a dual approach, we cannot measure losses due to (i) and (ii), a disadvantage to the use of duality theory. However, as Debreu [4, p. 286] notes, the third kind of loss "is the most subtle (in fact, perhaps hardly conceivable to the layman) and therefore the one for which a numerical evaluation is the most necessary." primary factor (M = 1), then the Debreu and Allais measure can be made to coincide. 13 We can consider the direction of tax change problem in the context of the coefficient of resource utilization. Suppose that u, p , to, t , T and p = 1 satisfy equations (39) and (40). Then u, p. , to, t. , and T will satisfy equations (15)-(18) and thus will correspond to an initial tax ridden competitive equilibrium. We ask whether the government can change tax rates and simultaneously confiscate fixed factors in such a way so that each consumer stays at his initial utility level. Upon totally differentiating (39) and (40) with respect to p, p. , to, t. , and T Differentiate (49) with respect to (, regarding p, p. , tog t. , and T as functions of (. After cancelling some terms and using equations (40), we get [28] , and Green and Sheshinski [13] in the context of several specific models. An advantage of our "local" approach as opposed to the Shoven-Whalley "global" approach is that we require only local information about preferences and technology. Of course, the disadvantage of the "local" approach is that the measures of welfare loss or gain may be quite inaccurate for large changes in tax rates.
Some additional limitations of our models are: (i) there is no foreign sector, (ii) government expenditures are held fixed, (iii) there are no distortionary taxes (such as manufacturer's excise taxes) within the production sector, (iv) there is no monopolistic or monopsonistic behavior, and (v) the model is atemporal-there is no savings or investment behavior in the economy. Our model can be extended to cover the omissions noted in (i) to (iv) above. For example, in order to deal with (iii), we need only decompose the private production sector into two sectors, one of which produces the taxed good and the other which uses the taxed good as an input. Markup monopolistic pricing behavior can readily be modelled by regarding the markups as taxes, where the tax revenue accrues to the monopolists (cf. Harberger [16, pp. 72-3] for an exposition of this approach). However, it appears to be extremely difficult to patch up (v). 16 The fundamental problem is that it is difficult to define optimality in an economy with incomplete markets, a situation which characterizes all real life economies.
An interesting issue that we have not explored is: under what conditions will the various loss measures be large? Inspection of the Boiteux measure of welfare loss LB defined by (32) and (31) suggests that the loss will increase as substitutability both in consumption and production increases, i.e., as the aggregate 16See Dixit [11] on this topic. It should also be mentioned that difficulties (i), (ii), (iii), and (v) are all relaxed to varying degrees in the empirical work of Shoven and Whalley. Also Whalley [35] actually utilizes Debreu's coefficient of resource utilization in order to obtain numerical measures of the resources which could be saved by changing the tax system for some European countries. 
